Regional development -old and new
Policies for regional development have undergone a major shift since the 1980s, under the influence of changed circumstances and new thinking about the nature of the problem. In the old paradigm, development is largely a matter of getting the right combination of factors of production to achieve efficiency. There is, generally speaking, only one such combination and hence one best way of achieving efficient production. Territory in this view is important only in the sense of location, that is only as far as distance affects the costs of production. So proximity to raw materials and markets is important, and it may matter whether suppliers are near enough to users to reduce the transportation costs of intermediary goods but that is all. Regional policy thus sought to remove these locational disadvantages by a variety of mechanisms, but above all by investing in infrastructure, and diverting investment in manufacturing industry from booming regions into needy ones. More elaborate forms of policy included 'growth poles', a concept originally devised with a sectoral meaning but adapted to territory, in which large industries would be located in development regions with a view to stimulating the growth of suppliers and complementary producers. In this way, it was hoped, a self-sustaining growth cycle could be started.
Diversionary policy has long been criticized in some quarters as expensive and ineffective and its effects have been portrayed as, at best, a dependent form of development, extremely vulnerable to changes beyond the region as large industry restructures. Since the 1970s, policy has gradually evolved to place more emphasis on the needs of self-sustaining development, endogenous development and entrepreneurship. Human capital and training became important elements from the 1980s, along with technology transfer and innovation. These developments in thinking were encouraged by changing external circumstances. The oil crises of the 1970s undermined the booming central places which had served as the sources of diversionary capital, and unemployment spread throughout the territories of the industrialized countries. Internationalization of the economy and the emergence of continental free trade regimes such as the EC and NAFTA reduced the ability of states to steer investment into priority regions. At times of fiscal difficulty, regional development expenditures were an obvious target and were in many cases cut back or passed down to lower level governments. In the European Union, the field was largely Europeanized following the Single European Act as the Commission sought to police national subsidy policies and put in place its own regional development programmes.
Since the 1980s, thinking has focused even more on the qualities of territories themselves, going beyond matters of location and infrastructure, into the social construction of the local economy. This has been heavily influenced by economic sociology (Swedburg 1993) , by work on the 'social construction of the market', and by the debate on different models of capitalism. All of these have sought to demonstrate that there is not one best mode of production, that capitalism is socially embedded and takes different forms in different places, and that the market is, like other social phenomena, a human product which also takes different forms in different contexts. Territory then becomes, not merely location, but the basis of a whole complex of social relationships, behaviours and norms. Attention is focused on networks of actors, on public-private interactions, on the insertion of the region into the global economy. This is in many ways reminiscent of the old Marshallian notion of 'industrial districts', in which firms in the same sector conglomerate in space, or of the growth pole theory, in which the emphasis is on complementarity in productive sectors and relationships between suppliers and users. What is new about the new paradigm, however, is the shift in emphasis from these types of traded interdependencies to 'untraded interdependencies' (Storper, 1995; Scott, 1996 Scott, , 1998 Courchene, 1995) in the form of public goods and conventions and understandings. This idea is necessarily an elusive one but covers mutual understandings and forms of trust that enable producers to overcome the inherent difficulties of capitalism, based as it is on the ethos of individualistic competition, to foster the cooperation necessary for successful production. What matters in this model is the ability to get the right combination of apparently conflicting qualities -cooperation and competition; stability and flexibility; craftsmanship and technology.
The context has been changed massively by globalization and Europeanization, which have undermined the very idea of national economies and placed regions in more direct contact with the international market place. Regions are now in competition with each other, for capital, for markets and for technology, reinforcing the need for internal cooperation and cohesion. This calls for another apparently contradictory combination of qualities -local rootedness and openness to the outside. Again, these qualities are to be found in the social construction of the region itself.
Regional economists have written extensively on these new approaches to development but it has proved remarkably difficult to pin down the nature of the qualities that make for a successful and competitive region and even more difficult to show how they can be reproduced. Early studies of the 'third Italy' have subsequently been criticized as exceptional, or based on a partial view of reality (Ritaine, 1989; Amin and Thrift, 1994 ). Ohmae's (1995) breathless account is a piece of economic determinism, confounding the rise of regional economies with the decline of the nation-state, and is motivated by a visceral dislike of the welfare state and a belief in a darwinian world order in which regions fight it out for advantage. Putnam's (1993) account veers to cultural determinism and pathdependency, claiming that the conditions for the success of the northern and central Italian regions are located in a (misunderstood) mediaeval past which fostered self-reliance and 'civicness'. Fukayama (1995) sees the key element as 'trust' a concept so broadly defined as to be impossible to operationalize. Much reference is made to the idea of 'social capital', a set of embedded qualities that promote cooperation in society, but all too often this concept is defined in a purely circular manner, as that which promotes cooperation, or explained teleologically as a response to the need for cooperation. Coleman similarly defined social capital by the functions that it performs, but then went on to note that this leaves social capital as an unanalyzed concept so that there needs to be a 'second stage in the analysis to unpack the concept, to discover what components of social organization contribute to the value produced' (Coleman, 1988, p.S101) .
Another important element is institutions and the way in which they promote various forms of cooperative and competitive behaviour. The new institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1984) emphasizes the role of institutions in moulding behaviour and choice. It defines institutions broadly -this is what distinguishes it from traditional institutionalism with its formal and legalistic basis. Yet this raises two further problems. Firstly, what are the boundaries of institutions and what is the status of norms and values inculcated through informal practices and social arrangements? If institutions are interpreted very broadly to include social norms and practice, then we are perhaps not talking of institutions at all but of culture. This culture-institutions debate is a staple of contemporary social science. Secondly, there is the question of how institutions arise and how they are perpetuated.
Finally, we need to ask about the nature of development itself. To measure regional development simply by GDP per capita is too simple since, apart from technical issues such as how to measure extractive industries, it tells us little about the quality of life, the distributional impact of growth or the social, cultural and environmental costs of growth. So we need to consider different development models, their characteristics, and their social and institutional foundations (Keating, 1998a) . The question is then not merely how regional firms compete in the global economy, but how the region can maintain its social and cultural cohesion in competitive markets. There is a long tradition in social science, going back to Durkheim, which identifies traditionalism with regionalism, and modernity with the end of territorial distinctiveness. More recently, this argument has returned based, this time, not on the homogenizing effects of the nation state but on those of globalization (Badie, 1995) . Globalization and European integration have, in fact, not effaced territory, but reshaped it in various ways (Keating, 1997) . There is still a traditional regionalism, but recent years have seen the emergence of a new, modernizing regionalism, seeking to combine the maintenance of cultural cohesion and social structures with modernization and development (Keating, 1998a) . This links to the new development paradigm, in which emphasis is placed precisely on these elements of cultural and institutional cohesion. So we need to take into account cultural characteristics, not in deterministic manner, but rather as elements to be used by political and social leaders in a process of region-and institutionbuilding. In contemporary Europe, we are seeing a range of region-building projects which cannot be explained simply by the needs of functional restructuring but are also the product of political action.
These ideas are cycled and recyled between academics and practitioners to the point at which it is unclear whether we are talking of practical arrangements observed by researchers, or of theoretical ideas borrowed from academia by practitioners. There is a constant danger of the new paradigm becoming a new orthodoxy, forgetting the central point of the new wisdom, which centres on the differential response of different territories to the challenges of globalization and technological change (Storper, 1997) . There is no substitute, therefore, for studies of individual places and the constitution of territorial systems of action in very specific contexts.
The invention of regions
The last two decades have seen the 'rise of regional Europe' (Harvie, 1994 ) and a growing debate on the significance of regions and their place in the new European and global order. This 'new regionalism' (Keating, 1998a ) is characterized by its complexity and diversity and its extension beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. It is explicable by a combination of factors that have given new meaning to territory and shaped new regional spaces. The first of these is functional restructuring, notably in the economy. Free trade, sectoral restructuring and changes in production technology have in some ways reduced the importance of territory, notably by reducing transportation costs, but in other respects they have enhanced it, by increasing the importance of non-traded interdependencies and reshaped it by fostering new systems of production and innovation. These new economic spaces, as often noted, correspond neither to the economic map of the first industrial era, nor to the boundaries of states. Secondly, there is culture, defined by felt identities and solidarities, language and social practices. Culture too has in one sense been deterritorialized and globalized but at the same time new cultural spaces have emerged and old ones been revalorized. Thirdly, there are institutions, in state and civil society. Regional governments have been established or strengthened across much of Europe and there has been some growth in regional civil society, including business organizations, trade unions, and social and cultural bodies. These three dimensions of territorialization may or may not coincide spontaneously and to deduce the second and third from the needs of the first (economic restructuring) would be to perpetuate the sort of economic determinism which students of European integration have largely abandoned. Region-building must, rather, be seen as a political project in which leaders, using symbolic references, public policies and institutional development, build up a territorial frame of reference and forge a territorial system of action. This has a discursive and ideological dimension, in which the region is created as an imagined community, and then organized as social space (Cabrera, 1992) . To recognize this is to reject both primordialist accounts in which regions are condemned to a future based on their inherited characteristics, and a functionalist or structural/contingency account, in which regions are shaped by global economic forces. Of course, both cultural heritage and external economic forces matter, but their impact is mediated by the actions of political, social and economic leaders within the territories themselves.
Forging a successful regional development project and inserting the region into the European and global trading order is thus a complex and multidimensional task. Regions are not necessarily condemned by geography to backwardness or progress; nor on the other hand is there a magic formula allowing regions to innovate and grow. Rather, there are objective economic strengths and weaknesses, but also social, cultural and political factors that shape how the region responds. Certainly, purely objective factors are important. Peripherality is a handicap to many regions, one exacerbated by European integration which costs them their captive national markets and increases their distance from economic centres. The traditional response, more investment in infrastructure, may enable them to export more but also exposes local industries to more competition. Other regions, by contrast, may be less peripheral in Europe than in their national markets. Natural resources and communications are still important, and resource-based regional economies are dependent on decisions taken elsewhere and highly vulnerable to economic fluctuations. The sectoral structure of a region is critical, with many regions over-represented in declining sectors.
Political factors are also important. State policies may be more or less favourable to the region and the region may be better or worse represented in national decision-making. The same applies to European policies. The policies of regional governments and agencies similarly may be well designed, or may simply perpetuate the problem. This will depend on the quality of policy advice and intelligence at the disposal of decision-makers but also on the balance of forces on the ground. Entrenched interests may oppose policies for change. Employers may fear competition for labour, or labour interests may fear loss of employment in declining sectors. Traditional producers may fear the loss of favourable policies and concessions. A widely recognized problem is that of clientelism, where political elites concentrate on divisible benefits, scattering funds broadly on small projects in order to win maximum political advantage, while failing to invest in large-scale projects or adopt a broader, regional vision. It has even been argued that in clientelist systems the patrons have an interest in there not being selfsustaining development, since this would undermine the power base of the patron.
Cultural factors that affect the regional development project include the existence of diffuse trust and willingness to cooperate and the presence or absence of defensive attitudes. There is endless debate on whether such attitudes are entrenched in certain societies and transmitted through the generations, or whether they merely represent a stereotype, which may be internalized by the people themselves as an auto-stereotype. Certainly, whenever one does field work in a culturally distinct region, respondents quickly resort to the auto-stereotype to characterize their compatriots and social relationships. The most common ones are the defensive individualism characteristic of peasant societies, and which recalls Banfields 'amoral familism'; and the cooperative, solidaristic stereotype in which people tell each other positive stories about themselves and their ability to work productively together. Another cultural factor concerns the relationship between local culture and language and the world of business and commerce. In many regions, there is a diglossia, in which the local language is used for family purposes and in social encounters, while the state language is used for high-status purposes and anything to do with business. This may encourage an inferiority complex and deprive the region of the language and culture as a mobilizing factor in competitive development. Regions may also be more or less socially integrated in a common culture, or experience a large gap between regionally-minded traditionalists and cosmopolitan progressives. Regionalism in many parts of Europe is still associated with backwardness and opposition to progress; in other places it has been taken up as a symbol of modernity. Similarly, regionalism may be closed and inward-looking, or it may, especially in the context of the new Europe, be internationalist.
Social factors include demography and patterns of emigration and immigration. Regions of high emigration may experience a drain of the most dynamic sectors of the population. Regions of immigration face the challenge of integrating the incomers and maintaining their distinct identity in the global market. Class relations are also important. Some regions, especially the older industrial regions, may have a history of class conflict rooted in past experiences and a consequent social polarization which militates against social cooperation. Some regions may have a dynamic, locally-rooted business class; in others the old bourgeoisie may have sold out in the past, or may never have existed.
Institutional factors include both government and civil society. A high degree of governmental fragmentation, at the regional or local level, may inhibit priority-setting and cooperation, institutionalize conflict and encourage the scattering of expenditures. Party systems may encourage competition over the definition of a regional interest, or may institutionalize clientelism and discourage interest aggregation. There may be a dynamic civil society, with institutions to encourage participation and innovation and facilitate social cooperation, or civil society may be dependent on or penetrated by the political class. Putnam (1993) emphasizes the importance of voluntary associations in fostering civic virtue, an idea he has subsequently extended to the USA. The problem here is that associations can be of many kinds. Some are active, while others are empty shells. Some are participative, while others are instruments of domination. Some are cooperative, and others are more concerned with rentseeking and the defence of existing positions.
None of these factors can really be studied in isolation. Clientelism, for example, is generally recognized as both a cultural and an institutional phenomenon. Indeed, the dependence of institutions on cultural norms means that, at the margin, it is very difficult to distinguish them. Regional solidarity and collective identity is not something that arises purely spontaneously. The region is too large a unit for relationships of propinquity to spawn common identity. Instead the region is an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983) , in which people who are not personally acquainted can share a common identity. Political leadership can serve to create new imaginative spaces, overcoming divisions and obstructions, but it helps a great deal to have ready-made cultural symbols to be mobilized for this purpose. Auto-stereotypes, or the stories people tell about themselves, can themselves become a part of the social reality (Sabel, 1993) , influencing action and expectations, and then can be stimulated or discouraged by leadership. In this sense, region-building bears a strong resemblance to nation-building, with its mobilization of symbolic values and its selective use of history. The key difference is that in this case we are not talking of the construction of a state or the mobilization of state powers and resources. Rather, it is a question of building a system of social regulation and collective action below the level of the nation-state, and lacking sovereign powers. This is being done in a context of globalization and European integration, which place regions in direct contact with the global market and, to some degree, with European institutions.
The rest of the paper looks at the construction of a development model in two historic regions of Spain, Catalonia and Galicia. Both are recognized as 'historic nationalities', with their own languages, histories, cultures, and traditions. They have similar government institutions as Spanish autonomous communities. Yet their experience with development and change has been very different. Some of these differences are to do with objective factors, such as location and industrial structure. Others are concerned with culture and its use. Above all, there are key differences in the way in which the region has been imaginatively created and recreated by political and social elites. Neither has a unchanging culture, fixed in time, but both are adapting in their own ways to new external and internal pressures.
Catalonia
Catalonia has long been one of the most advanced regions of Spain. A Mediterranean trading power in the middle ages, it experienced a second economic take-off from the eighteenth century when it was the first part of Spain to industrialize. In the mediaeval era it was a central place but was somewhat marginalized with the rise of empire and the shift of trade to the Atlantic. Within the European Union, it is relatively central, with its location on the Mediterranean and its position as a gateway from Europe to the Iberian peninsula. This locational factor has not only shaped Catalonia's trading relationships, but has moulded its culture, as a region of passage, from the Carolingian age, when it was known as the Spanish Mark, to the European Single Market, when it has enabled Catalans to present themselves as quintessential Europeans. In the early part of the Franco dictatorship, Catalonia suffered for its support for the defeated Republic, but from the 1950s was the location of many of the regime's development initiatives, with the consequent influx of waves of immigrants from southern Spain. In the 1980s there was a painful process of restructuring in the older industrial regions of Spain as the traditional, heavy industries, often state-owned or sponsored, were run down and reorganized. Now that this process is largely complete, policy attention has moved to the growing sectors and the smaller and medium sized firms. Currently, Catalonia's GDP is 94 per cent of the average for the EU, but there are some remaining structural problems in the old industries, a lack of dynamism in some of the small firms, and a heavy reliance on inward investment for technology, innovation and growth.
Catalonia since the transition has been marked by a process of nation or region-building, with the imperative, as Jordi Pujol has put it, to fer país. There is a strong ideological dimension to this, as the dominant forces have sought to impose their own vision and make Catalonia the frame of reference for political and social change. It builds on elements of the social structure already present, and encompasses institutions, culture and economic development in a broad project for change. Some elements of this project are broadly shared within the society, while others are contested.
Catalonia has a very strong sense of identity as a minority nation within Spain, but separatism is relatively weak, compared for example with the Basque Country, as is support for Spanish centralization. The dominant political orientations are a moderate nationalism represented by the governing Convergència i Unió, and a moderate socialism which favours a federal Spain. The Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya is officially in favour of independence, but only in the long term and within an integrated 'Europe of the Peoples'. In the forthcoming Catalan elections of 1999, the moderate nationalist Jordi Pujol will be challenged by the Socialist Pasquall Maragall, who is trying to put together a coalition which will be non-nationalist while still being recognizably 'Catalanist'. This means that, while there are constant arguments over constitutional matters, there is still a broad consensus on their limits and a diffuse nationalism sufficiently moderate to incorporate large sections even of the immigrant population, especially in the second generation. Catalans generally recognize multiple identities as Catalan, Spanish and local, without undue difficulty (Keating, 1996) . Catalan nationalism has a usable history in the memory of Catalan autonomy before 1714, and in the mediaeval legacy as a trading nation. This was reinforced and refurbished by Catalan nationalism, a product of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which was originally led by the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, defined Catalonia by the combination of business dynamism and traditionalism, and dreamed of modernizing Spain by 'catalanizing' it. Catalan nationalism in this phase was highly protectionist, since Catalan goods were not competitive elsewhere in Europe and this combination of demands for self-government with the need for the protected Spanish market gave a profound ambivalence to the movement. Catalan nationalism is now strongly pro-European and has been at the forefront of the Europe of the Regions movement, seeking a new political order in which stateless nations will have a defined place alongside, but not entirely replacing, the old state system. Moderate nationalism is thus almost a hegemonic ideology, while containing enough variants to encompass most of the active population. The most serious charge laid against Pujol within Catalonia is not that he is a nationalist, but that he tries to monopolize Catalanism, giving it his own interpretation and defining it too narrowly.
Catalan identity is strongly correlated with language. This is understood by 94 per cent of the population and spoken by 68 per cent (Generalitat, 1997) . Proficiency in Catalan is much lower among the immigrant population, but the strong social incentives to learn it make it a vehicle for the assimilation of immigrant children. The language has a high social status, since it was never abandoned by the middle classes and experienced important revivals in the late nineteenth century and in this century. As a Latin-based language it is sufficiently close to Castilian to be accessible to anyone who wants to learn it and virtually all native Catalans are bilingual, switching easily between the languages. It thus serves as an important factor in group identity and social cohesion without raising insurmountable barriers between groups of the population within Catalonia (Keating, 1998b) . At the same time, a vigorous language normalization policy seeks to make Catalan the main vehicle of social communication. It use has been extended in the schools, where almost all elementary and large parts of secondary and tertiary education are in the medium of Catalan. The idea eventually is that all children should have a command of Catalan, Castilian and a third language (normally English or French), so being able to function at home in their own language while also operating in the Spanish and European arenas. There is an extensive policy of encouragement and subsidization of Catalan in the media, publishing and the arts. In some respects, cultural policy has been a success as levels of competence in Catalan have increased sharply.
Its limits, however, are still set by the world of economics and business. Catalan is used rather little in business and commerce and employers have been very reluctant to cooperate in extending its use in the economy, regarding it as a burden. Given the strong social and political support for the language, they have been cautious in overt criticism of language normalization, but they have resisted requirements to label their products in Catalan or to project Catalan abroad. This may stem from a perception that Catalan is seen negatively in the rest of Spain and could damage their market prospects and that it represents an additional cost, an unnecessary one given that anyone who can read Catalan also reads and understands Castilian. So, while the first language law of 1983 caused little controversy, except among some die-hard Spanish nationalists, the second law, of 1998, did provoke opposition. This did not involve a social confrontation but rather took the form of mobilization by groups of Castilian-speaking intellectuals and civil servants on the one hand, and by business people on the other. Ironically, the strongly nationalist Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya also declined to support the law, because it did not go far enough into the world of business and commerce, complaining that it Catalan was in danger of becoming the modern equivalent of mediaeval Latin, used in schools and government, but less and less in commerce. At the same time, Catalan faces a challenge in metropolitan Barcelona, Catalonia's gateway to Europe and the world.
Catalan national identity is sufficiently open to accommodate incomers and to provide a force for integration without closing the society off from the outside. Respondents in Catalonia almost invariably come up with two other auto-stereotypes. The first is of Catalans' business acumen and entrepreneurial spirit. The other is the tendency to pactism and compromise and the tradition of seny (Giner et al., 1996) , the latter being roughly analogous to the mythical anglo-saxon virtues of common sense, practical wisdom and moderation. There is evidence that Catalans are slightly more inclined to business values than people elswhere in Spain and they are more secularized (Orizo and Sánchez Fernández, 1991) . They certainly believe this about themselves. Surveys in 1976 and 1992 showed Catalans attributing their economic success not to natural advantages, to investment or to the state, but to the character of the people (García Ferrando, 1994) . Catalans see themselves are more entrepreneurial and hard working than other Spanish peoples, an attitude reflected, albeit more weakly in the attitude of the latter toward Catalans (Sangrador . The construction of the self-stereotype is of greater interest given that Catalans are much less likely to characterize themselves individually according to the austere, work-oriented and business-inspired stereotype than they are to apply this to their fellow Catalans as a whole. This suggests strongly that this is a created or imagined collective image, used instrumentally. Outsiders tend to give Catalan attributes a more negative interpretation, seeing them as closed, mean and egotistical (Sangrador García, 1996) . Defenders of the pactist interpretation of Catalonia point to the tradition of limited sovereignty in the middle ages and the complex arrangements for accommodating social and political interests. They then note the tendency since the transition to pactism and negotiated order. Critics point to the polarization and violence of Catalan society in the first four decades of the twentieth century, and note that pactism has been a feature of Spanish political practice generally since the transition. Once again, we are faced with the question of a usable past. Catalonia does have pactist traditions but it also has a history of extremism and the choice to revalorize the pactist tradition as a legitimation of present practice and a means for confronting the conflicts inherent in Catalonia's condition, is a political one, made by political and social leaders and made acceptable to their followers. It is not an automatic product of some path-dependent history. As it happens, this practice of pactism and accommodation and the search for consensus are effective mechanisms, not only for managing nationality conflict, but also for managing regional change and modernization in the conditions we have noted above. Once again, this is not an automatic connection (which in this case would be teleological) but a social and political choice, made effective under favourable conditions. and the new economic conditions. Catalonia's autonomous government, the Generalitat, is strongly entrenched by southern European standards and is a prime point of reference for citizens. It must coexist with field services of the Spanish state and there is considerable competition here. The Generalitat has sought to separate itself as much as possible from the state administrative network, notably by setting up its own system of intermediate administration, the comarcas, in order to by-pass the four provinces recognized by the state. Indeed, it was prevented from abolishing the provinces only by the constitution. There is also political and administrative competition with the city of Barcelona, a fief of the Socialists, although the Generalitat was able to abolish the corporation of Metropolitan Barcelona, a bastion of the old regime and its officials. In this way, the Generalitat has been able to enhance its own decision-making and strategic capacity and promote an all-Catalonia vision. Political and generational change have transformed the bureaucracy from Francoist and pre-Franco times and performance levels are generally quite high. This is not to say that clientelism is absent; opponents constantly complain that the Generalitat uses its cultural and social programmes to favour those who share its vision. The main infrastructure and economic development initiatives are not, however, subject to purely clientelist logic. The Generalitat has established a strong image locally, and Catalans see it as more efficient and less corrupt than the central government, and favour the expansion of its powers (García Ferrando et al., 1994) . This is particularly so amongst those most fluent in Catalan and among the younger sections of the population.
Catalonia does have its own civil society, with a dense network of associations and groups, although the self-perception does not always match the reality. The European Values Study suggests that Catalans are not great joiners, with lower levels of organizational membership than the rest of Spain (Orizo and Sánchez Fernández, 1991) and many organizations are empty shells. At the time of the transition, there were vibrant social movements, especially in the large urban areas, since this was one space where it was possible to mobilize under late Francoism. In the succeeding years, however, this energy has been absorbed and canalized by the political parties, which have grown to dominate civil society and organizational life. Its economy is quite diversified, and dominated by a dense network of very small firms on the one hand and large multinationals on the other, without a sort of middle-sized firms that are so important in Germany. There is a Catalan employers organization the Foment de Treball Nacional but, despite its title and its origins in the eighteenth century, it is highly integrated into the Spanish employers' organization CEOE, in whose founding it played a key role. Employers organizations were very suspicious of the movement to political autonomy in the early years but have now learned to live with it and, as the Generalitat has become their main interlocutor, to support more of it. On the trade union side, the Comisió Obrera Nacional de Catalunya (CONC) is the equivalent of the traditionally Communist Spanish Comisiones Obreras (CCOO), although it does have a certain autonomy and campaigns on Catalan themes. The traditionally Socialist Unión General de Trabajadores is more tightly integrated into its Spanish parent body. While this does weaken an independent Catalan trade unionism, it nevertheless helps integrate immigrant workers, who might avoid an overtly nationalist union, into the Catalan community. Trade unions, here as in the rest of Spain, are highly integrated into the administrative system, with extensive rights of consultation and a network of sectoral and local collective agreements, but their membership is very low, under eight per cent of the working population.
Class relations in Catalonia also present paradoxes. On the one hand, given the predominance of small and family firms, there is less social distance between workers and employers and a disposition to negotiation and compromise. On the other hand, Catalonia in the early twentieth century possessed one of the most revolutionary working classes in Europe, and violence was endemic, as witness the Setmana Tragica of 1909 or the confrontations of the Second Republic and Civil War. Once again, this shows the danger of generalizations and stereotypes. There are in Catalan history both traditions of conflict and traditions of compromise. Since the transition of the 1970s, the compromising elements have been promoted and predominated. Another marked feature of the Catalan class structure has been the predominance of a regional bourgeoisie and the relative lack of social importance of elites linked to the military or state service who have been so crucial in other parts of Spain. The existence of this regional bourgeoisie was vital in the industrialization of Catalonia in the nineteenth century and in the reinvention of Catalonia as a nation. Many of the upper bourgeoisie, including leaders of the old Lliga Regionalista, went over to Francoism during or after the Civil War (Riera, 1998) and later the rise of state-controlled firms and the Madrid conglomerates weakened the native industrial class further. Since the 1980s, large industry has increasingly come under the sway of multinationals. There does, however, remain, a distinctly Catalan bourgeoisie, rooted in the small business sector and this provides an important base for the parties of CiU. A final element of the class structure is the immigrant population, numbering around 40 per cent of the population at the time of the transition in the 1970s. This is largely working class, producing some overlap of national and class identity. On the other hand, there is also a substantial Catalan working class and, while there is some residential segregation, there is very little workplace friction or social confrontation between immigrants and natives, and a high degree of assimilation of immigrants in the second generation.
Catalonia's economic development strategy corresponds to what I have elsewhere (Keating, 1998a) called 'bourgeois regionalism', the promotion of a territorial economic interest in partnership with the local business elite. The economic policies of the Generalitat are officially based on non-intervention in line with the ideological stance of the ruling coalition. Industrial subsidies are not employed to any great extent, although this may represent the rationalization of necessity since, under EU regulations, Catalonia is not a region in which large-scale subsidization would be permitted. Instead, there is an emphasis on encouraging innovation and the emergence of industrial clusters, though no attempt to determine what these should be. Technology transfer design centres are fostered by the government, but run at arm's length by companies which must pay their own way. Firms similarly are expected to pay for services received from the government. Policy is delivered through a series of agencies with private participation rather than directly by government. There is a strong emphasis on internationalization of the Catalan economy, notably through COPCA, an agency with offices in 33 cities around the world. This is also a light structure, dependent on local agents in the countries concerned and responding to demand. There is a dominating ideology of social cooperation, within the limits of a competitive market economy, but there is nothing that might be considered as regional corporatism. Employers' and labour organizations are too weak and too tightly integrated into their state counterparts to permit this, and there in no interest on the part of the government. There have been important tripartite initiatives in labour relations, with the establishment of an industrial tribunal to mediate labour disputes. In 1998 labour market policy was transferred to the Generalitat and at this time a Consell de Treball de Catalunya (Labour Council of Catalonia) was formed with tripartite representation to advise on labour relations. These all represent steps towards a distinctive Catalan model of industrial relations, building on the perception that labour relations are generally better there, that employers are more responsible, workers more work-oriented and labour relations less politicized. On the other hand, both unions and employers are rather tightly controlled by their parent bodies, and the state still has important functions in this area. Nor, significantly, do tripartite negotiations and agreements take place in Catalan. Most are registered in Castilian and then translated into Catalan.
Territorial planning is quite well developed in Catalonia, aided by the monocephalic structure of the region, focused on Barcelona and the main transport routes to Europe and to the rest of Spain. Francoist planning was based on expansion of heavy industry, with state-sponsored mega-projects and little attention to coherent urban planning, accompanied by rampant land speculation and corruption. Since the transition there has been an effort to develop better land use policies, to control urban sprawl, to provide better services and to improve social integration. The city of Barcelona has been transformed under the leadership of its local council, with the Olympic Games of 1992 being used as an opportunity to attract new development and rehabilitate whole zones of the old city. The Olympic works themselves were behind schedule and the whole programme was bedeviled by conflict between the Generalitat and the city corporation over control and who would get the credit, but everything was ready for the day and the general organization is often contrasted favourably with the contemporary World's Fair in Seville. A land agency, the Institut Català del Sol, is active in assembling parcels of land for residential and industrial development, with powers of compulsory purchase. It then plans the development of the new zones, to ensure a rational use of space and the provision of housing for various income groups. Again, the strategy avoids direct public ownership, using cooperatives to provide social housing. Certainly, there have been corruption scandals and accusations of patronage in urban planning and land use policies, but generally urban and regional planning has worked well in Catalonia. Given the complexities of the matter and the multitude of actors and interests involved, this does suggest a willingness to cooperate in pursuit of agreed ends and to deliver on undertakings.
Galicia
Galicia's economic prospects are dominated by its peripheral location, both within Spain and in Europe. It is off the main land trade routes, and its maritime trading prospects in Spain's era of greatness were long stymied by the monopoly of the American trade held by Cadiz, while Lisbon, down the coast, captured the Portuguese imperial trade. Galicia's economy developed in a dependent mode, with an emphasis on raw materials, notably wood and granite, to be processed elsewhere. Francoist development plans reinforced this model, adding massive hydro-electric schemes to provide power for industrialization of other Spanish regions. There is a sharp division between the coast, where Europe's largest fishing fleet operates, and the hinterland, dominated by thousands of tiny and poorly commercialized farms. A similar cleavage exists between the large cities, with a large presence of state servants and military personnel, and the countryside. Added to the region's natural disadvantages at the time of the transition was a poorly developed infrastructure, including roads, railways, ports, airports and telecommunications. EU membership has increased the peripherality of Galicia and poses challenges to its traditional industries. Fishermen have come into conflict with those of other states over access and face problems of stock depletion. Traditional industries and agriculture face competition from Europe and the imposition of quotas, notably in milk and steel, while the farmers fail to get the same benefits as the large producers of northern Europe from the Common Agricultural Policy. Galicia's GDP per capita is just 60 per cent of the EU average, about two thirds that of Catalonia, although living standards are brought much closer to the Spanish average though transfer payments.
Unlike Catalonia, Galicia never produced a vibrant commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. The middle classes found employment in the state bureaucracy, the military or, if they entered the private sector, in the banks, while dynamic elements found outlets in internal or overseas migration. The failure to develop an entrepreneurial class was not due to lack of capital since, like many traditional societies, Galicia has had a high savings ratio, boosted from the eighteenth century by remittances from emigrants, but this money was usually placed elsewhere (Beiras, 1995) . Landholding until 1926 was organized on precapitalist lines, encouraging the proliferation of small holdings (minifundismo) and subsistence farming (Maíz, 1996) . Social relations within Galicia are polarized, with a fragmented class structure and a large social distance between the urban middle class, small farmers and the small industrial proletariat. Galicia is characterized by historically high levels of emigration. Between 1964 and 1991, some 312,000 people left (Pérez et al., 1996) . Until the mid-1960s the main emigrant destination was South America; thereafter most went to Europe (Costa Clavell, 1976) . Activity levels are among the highest in Spain and unemployment between 1964 and 1991 was only about half the Spanish average. By 1995 it had risen to 17.2 per cent, but this was still below the rate for Spain (22.7 per cent) or Catalonia (19.9 per cent). but this disguised low productivity and capitalization levels outside the extractive industries. Total factor productivity over the period 1964-91 was a little more than half than of Catalonia (Pérez et al., 1996) . There is much here that is consistent with dependency theory or 'internal colonialism' (Lafont, 1967) but the explanation for economic backwardness and the lack of dynamism is much contested.
It is still common to attribute it to ingrained features of Galician culture and these are reflected in the auto-stereotypes of respondents. The Galician peasant is described as individually or family oriented, without entrepreneurial ambition and unwilling to cooperate in the greater social good -features recalling Banfield's 'amoral familism' in Italy. This in turn has been attributed to the fragmented pattern of landholding and inheritance, to the historic domination of the Church, and to the failure of the state effectively to penetrate the countryside. Galician business leaders are said to be lacking in innovation, poorly trained in management and unwilling to specialize. Customers still expect one firm to provide a complete range of products and there is an unwillingness on the part of firms to cooperate in research, exports and marketing. Galicians themselves are prone to repeat these views. In the 1992 CIS survey (but not in the earlier 1976 one) they attributed economic inequalities to regional character rather than natural advantages, although unlike the Catalans they recognized the importance of investment, state policies and capitalism (García Ferrando et al., 1994) . Galegos neither see themselves nor are seen by others as being as entrepreneurial as the Catalans, having an image of conservatism and being tied to the land (Sangrado García, 1996) . While in no way sharing the business image of the Catalans, they are seen as more entrepreneurial than people in most other parts of Spain, and more so by outsiders than by themselves, perhaps reflecting the success of Galego business people outside the country and their lack of success at home. Once again, we have evidence of the power of autostereotypes as a mechanism for rationalizing people's condition.
Galicia does have its own employers' association, the Confederación de Empresarios de Galicia, which seeks to develop a regional vision. Galicia, unlike Catalonia, also has its own trade unions. There is a certain degree of collaboration, through the Consejo Económico y Social and its working groups. Most contact and work, for example on training schemes, however, is carried out at the provincial level. There has been some imitation of the Catalan experience, in establishing a Consejo Galego de Relaciones Laborales and a mediation tribunal for industrial disputes but this experience is rather recent.
There is evidence for a lack of capacity for large-scale social mobilization in Galicia. Álvarez Corbacho (1995) has demonstrated that, while taxes and expenditures per capita in the large cities are equivalent to those elsewhere in Spain, the smaller Galician municipalities refuse to tax themselves at the same level. This not only reduces their own source revenue. Because central grants are linked to fiscal effort, it reduces their transfers from the centre as well. This practice is attributed to a disinclination to undertake projects for collective good and a reliance, instead, on clientelism and divisible goods. Instead of putting in place rigorous urban planning policies, municipalities permit sprawl, hoping to expand the property tax base as an alternative to increasing rates. Population in the countryside is widely dispersed and local road systems rarely connect with each other. Social networks are closed and there is a high degree of dependence on personal contacts and family connections. On the other hand, these networks themselves do represent more than mere individualism and there are plenty of voluntary associations, notably at the level of the rural parish and a tradition of cooperativism from the early twentieth century (Beiras, 1995) . Many of the stereotypical qualities of the Galician peasant can be turned around and seen as virtues (Mella, 1992) . Reflectiveness, formerly a euphemism for insecurity, is now seen as a positive trait. Lack of dogmatism, formerly a mark of dependence on outside views, may be portrayed as openness. Social equilibrium, formerly synonymous with stasis, may now permit measured change. What is lacking is a system of social mobilization at the regional level corresponding to the needs of modern development, and to explain this we need to look at symbolic integration and leadership, at institutions, and at policy.
Language is indicative of the problem. Galego is the only one of Spain's minority languages spoken by almost the entire population. This, however, is a reflection of the lack of immigration rather than the health of the language, since there is a sharp diglossia in use. Galego is spoken much more in the countryside than in the cities, more among the lower than the middle and upper classes and more in familiar than in formal settings (Real Academia Galega, 1995) . Given its concentration in the least literate sections of the population, its use in written communication is very small. Unlike Catalan, it has suffered social disdain and the upwardly mobile have traditionally avoided using it. Social progress is still equated with speaking Castilian and there is a tendency for urban and upper class people to be less favourably inclined to Galego and its extension in education and public life (Real Academia Galega, 1995) . In work, there is a tendency to use Galego with co-workers but Castilian to superiors (Real Academia Galega, 1999) . So, unlike Catalan, Galego cannot readily be used to construct an imagined community seen as dynamic, integrated, modern and European.
Political traditions and practices have served to perpetuate these traits. There is a definite sense of distinct Galician identity (García Ferrando et al., 1994; Moral, 1998 ) but this is not as strongly politicized as in Catalonia and not linked to a shared project for autonomy in Spain and Europe. The 1992 CIS survey showed that Galicians were slightly less likely than the average region to demand more powers for the autonomous community (García Ferrando et al., 1992) . Politics is localist and territorially fragmented (Maíz, 1996) and levels of participation in elections at all levels has traditionally been low. Turnout for the referendum on the statute of autonomy was only 29 per cent and participation in regional elections has been the lowest in Spain. Voting tends to be seen in narrowly instrumental terms, being highest in local elections in places where cacique influence is strongest and it can be presented as part of an individualized transaction, and lowest on where elections are fought on more abstract issues . Yet there are signs of change here. Electoral turnout increased from 47 per cent in 1981 to 64 per cent in 1997 and the gap with other regions has narrowed. Clientelism has a long history and was well established in the nineteenth-century, helped by the territorial and political fragmentation of the society and the centralization of power. The notables, or caciques survived the turbulence of the early twentieth century and persisted under Francoism, as Galicia, unlike Catalonia, was a stronghold of the dictatorship. This pervasive clientelism is another indication that it would be wrong to describe Galicia as 'individualist' since that implies a degree of self-sufficiency and independence that does not exist. Rather, the client system stifles the capacity for both individual and collective self-expression while favouring the production of divisible goods. Unlike Italian clientelism, the Galician variety operates at the collective rather than the individual level. Patrons do not generally command individual-level services like pensions or the ability to manipulate tax assessments, but depend on local collective benefits like roads, bridges and public works projects, delivered through local collaborators. This has created a pattern of political dependency mirroring the economic dependency of the region and militating against autonomous political mobilization.
The system has survived because of the fragmentation of Galician political life and the failure to mount an effective opposition or alternative project. The autonomous government has been dominated since it was set up by the Spanish Conservative Alianza/Partido Popular (PP) under the leadership, since 1989 of Manuel Fraga, former Franco minister and unsuccessful leader of the national opposition. The Galician PP is a combination of two rather distinct elements. A centralist, españolista element, dominated by the Madrid leadership, has little time for Galician particularism and is increasingly inclined to a form of economic and social neo-liberalism to which the national PP has gradually evolved; it is strongest in the cities and in the province of La Coruña. The other element is more rooted in the rural world of traditional Galicia and espouses a traditionalist and somewhat anti-modern type of regionalism, associated with folklore and resting on networks of clientelism and patronage. Neither element has a project for an autonomous model of Galician regional development and modernization. The Socialist Party, previously the main opposition, has declined amid factionalism and conflicts among its urban leaders and is no longer a serious contender for government. This has left the Bloque Nacionalista Galego as the official opposition in the regional parliament. Nationalism has a long history in Galicia, going back to the late nineteenth century, but it never achieved anything like the ideological hegemony it has had in Catalonia. It has been highly fractious, with no party ever able to establish its dominance over the nationalist camp. In contrast to Catalonia, there is no large 'bourgeois regionalist' party dedicated to modernization and integration into Europe. It is not that Galicia lacks such traditions. There has historically been a liberal, modernizing nationalism, going back to the last century and associated in the years before and after the Civil War with the legendary Castelao. In the 1980s, the Coalición Galega sought to occupy this space but it failed to thrive and was marginalized when the Galician PP adopted a regionalist rhetoric, incorporating the regionally-inclined members of the middle class (Maíz, 1996) . The Bloque itself is a coalition of parties, including traditional marxists, post-communists, social democrats, centrists and a variety of nationalist and regionalist options. Its political line tends to be rather demagogic and opportunist and it lacks a clear vision of Galicia's place in Spain and the new Europe. While in the other historic nationalities, there is a strong relationship between being competent in the local language and supporting more autonomy, this link is absent in Galicia (García Ferrando et al., 1994) suggesting that nationalism/regionalism has failed to bridge the domains of culture, language, politics and social mobilization. Language remains associated with a conservative traditionalist regionalism rather than a modernizing, European message.
On the issue of Europe, Galicia is more divided than Catalonia. The nationalist parties differ on the issue (Pérez and López Mira, 1996) with the leftist parties of the BNG tending to take the antiEuropean line that was common in many peripheral regions until the 1980s, when the Europe of the Regions theme led to a reappraisal. So while the Basque nationalists have managed to combine strong support for the idea of Europe with criticism of its actual policies, Galician nationalists have not. Manuel Fraga, on the other hand, took up the Europe of the Regions theme shortly after coming to office and has been very active on the European regional circuit. His regionalism is distinguished sharply from nationalism, being placed firmly within the context of the Spanish state and envisaging the regions as an entrenched third level of government (Fraga, 1991) . As noted below, Europe may prove an important force in opening up the Galician political system and undermining the old networks, but so far its impact within the domestic politics of Galicia has been limited. The adverse affects of European policies in sectors like fisheries, milk and shipbuilding have worked against promoting the sort of European vocation that Catalonia has forged.
Institutions also serve to maintain the old hegemony in Galicia and stifle movements for change. The dominance of the PP in the regional government meant that there was no big change in personnel from the Francoist era and only now is a new generation of officials, better trained and more oriented to change and development, coming into the administration. The Xunta (regional executive) itself is organized to reflect the factional interests within the ruling party, with a lot of duplication, fragmentation and personal fiefdoms. Administration is extremely complex, with a plethora of programmes for similar purposes, serving the needs of clientelism and distributive politics. In 1997, for example, the opposition criticized the establishment of a new public investment agency, designed to get around public spending restrictions by a form of creative accountancy that would allow it to issue debt which would be repaid by the Xunta after the year 2000. This put the agency beyond parliamentary control or scrutiny while providing yet another fund to be shared out in small clientelist operations across the region. The Spanish provinces, in contrast to Catalonia, are a key level of intermediation and distribution. Each is run by a PP 'baron', who thus channels both state and regional government patronage and keeps the local mayors in line. The barons, with their territorial power bases, are also key actors in Xunta politics, with rights of appointments to ministerial and official posts. These institutions correspond poorly to the organization of civil society and popular perception, focused on the parish or slightly larger area corresponding to the Catalan comarca (or what is known in Castilian as the país and in French as the pays). This, together with control of patronage and links into state and regional administration, enables the barons to maintain control and depress levels of popular mobilization and participation. There is a proposal to divide the region into comarcas, but these would respect provincial boundaries and the proposal has made little progress.
Correspondingly, the autonomous administration of the Xunta has a poorer image than its counterparts in Catalonia (or the Basque Country and Navarre). The 1992 survey showed that 39 per cent of Catalans, as opposed to only 26 in Galicia, considered the autonomous administration to be the most efficient level. 33 per cent in Galicia, against 19 per cent in Catalonia, thought that the autonomous administration wasted money -the figures for central government were 43 and 32 per cent respectively. 19 per cent in Galicia thought that the central administration was less corrupt, about three times as many as in the other historic nationalities and more than anywhere else except Madrid (García Ferrando, 1994) .
Industrial development policy in Galicia tends to the traditional. Spending on infrastructure has been very high, as elsewhere in Spain in the 1980s, bringing roads, telecommunication and airports up to European standards. There is a massive and largely indiscriminate programme of investment subsidies, up to the high limits laid down by the EU for the most needy regions (60 per cent of the investment over most of Galicia and 50 per cent in the rest of the region). These are largely financed by the state and the EU, although there is some cost to the region itself. While these grants are generally automatic and demand-led, investment in infrastructure follows a political and clientelistic logic (Alvarez Corbacho, 1995) , controlled by the provincial barons and their underlings. All this makes it difficult to impose strategic priorities, whether territorial or sectoral. There are universities in all four provinces, and the University of Vigo has a branch in neighbouring Pontevedra, the provincial capital. There are three airports with aspirations to international status, and there is competition between the main seaports. Land use planning and infrastructure projects are constantly frustrated by dispersed land ownership and unwillingness to alienate family property. Some strategic planning is provided by the need to produce the Community Support Framework for EU aid, but this is poorly integrated into other policy instruments. There is little policy innovation, but a constant tendency to look to Catalonia and to try and follow developments there. So the Catalan accords on labour market policy were followed by a similar initiative in Galicia. Tripartite concertation is weakened, however, by the relative strength of provincial political, business and union organizations and the weakness of representative organizations at the regional level.
All this would suggest that the factors which caused Galicia's underdevelopment in the past are being perpetuated, with the region trapped in a cycle of dependency. Yet in so far as these factors are the product not of primordial cultural traits but of institutional factors and political leadership, together with external circumstances, then there is scope for change. Such change would not mean the imposition on Galicia of an external model of development, but a programme to tap the inherent strengths of the region and to address its weaknesses. There are some signs of change. European integration is supported by almost everyone, although its actual effects are widely deplored. This has strengthened the neo-liberal wing of the PP, with their discourse of competitiveness and fiscal discipline, against the traditional regionalists. Europe, through the structural funds programmes, has also favoured public-private partnership and a shift in emphasis of policy from hard infrastructure and investment subsidies to human capital and training. It has encouraged policy evaluation and impact analysis. It has also sparked a debate on the position of the region within Europe, although there is as yet no vision such as exists in Catalonia. Rural depopulation is gradually undermining the power base of the traditionalists. The opening of the Portuguese border has had some major effects. Competition from lower wage labour in Portugal has undercut Galician industry, while Portuguese capital has entered in considerable quantities. Portugal, which has had one of the highest growth rates in the EU in recent years, also offers an example of modernization and change, although few think that the Portuguese model, based on low wages, can either be transferred directly or even survive unchanged in the longer term. Another external example is Ireland, an even more peripheral part of the EU which has enjoyed remarkable growth. There has been a steady institutionalization of the Xunta, with an improvement in the quality of officials and better policy capacity. Electoral participation has steadily increased and elections have become more competitive. There is an emerging nationalist alternative to the PP power bloc, although this is as yet poorly structured and without a clear vision or programme. There is a policy of linguistic normalization, less ambitious than in Catalonia, which seeks to raise the status of the language while extending its social use. This has had some success, but there is still resistance, with the more modernizing elements in society, including young people, still regarding it as an obstacle and insisting that it is more useful to gain proficiency in English. There are great efforts to increase the region's international connections, both in Europe and in Latin America. Like Ireland, Galicia has a large diaspora in America, whose success in business belies the simplistic ethnic stereotype, and there is an effort to mobilize them in order to gain trade opportunities and both inward and outward investment. The Galician employers' organization represents some of the more dynamic economic sectors and is active in promoting a regional vision while both it and the Xunta have begun to pay more attention to fostering good business practice, entrepreneurship and inter-firm cooperation.
Conclusion
The comparison of the two regions shows that location and resource endowment are still important factors in development, but that historical legacies, cultural endowments and social practices are important in constructing a development model. Yet cultural stereotypes and primordialist theories greatly over-simplify matters. Both regions have cultural and economic resources and a 'useable past' that can be pressed into service. Catalonia has its traditions of diffused authority, shared sovereignty and pactism, but Galicia has its relative social cohesion, an egalitarian ethos in the countryside and dispersed property ownership, which could be used as factors in a virtuous development model in the new economic order (Mella, 1992) . There is a much sharper contrast in the stereotypes atttributed to each region (Sangador García, 1981 than an in actual attitudes.
The cases also show that institutional arrangements matter. Both regions have similar formal structures of government, as autonomous communities on the 'fast track', yet institutionalization has taken different forms. Clientelism in Galicia is buttressed by the party system, by the administrative structure and the distorted pattern of political competition. Institution-building in Catalonia has taken a different form, representing more of a break from the old regime and from Spanish state practices, though not entirely free from clientelist elements itself. The idea that Catalonia is inherently 'associational' but Galicia is not does not really stand up to examination. Catalans are not great joiners, many of its associations are of dubious representativeness and the network of business associations is highly diverse and poorly integrated. Galicia is no better but it does have a network of groups and cooperatives. Nor does the 'individualist' stereotype of the Galician help a great deal. Catalans are rather individualist, while Galicians look to institutions and elites for leadership. What matters is more the linkage between government and civil society and the opportunities for groups and associations to influence policy, and the incentives for them to adopt positive-sum attitudes. Institutionalism may be a better guide here than cultural reductionism. Leadership is critically important in this matter, as it is in building the 'imagined community' at the right spatial level. A selective use of history is part of this as is the use of language and cultural policy to present a self-image and identity. In both cases, as in many regions, symbols of identity, notably language, are stronger in the countryside than in the cities, which are at the forefront of modernization and globalization, but this is much more pronounced in Galicia. Catalonia has associated its traditions, its language and its culture with a modernity that respects tradition. Galego and Galician culture are still seem somehow as an obstacle to modernity. Another aspect is the projection of success. Catalonia has some serious structural economic problems and social strains; its membership of the Four Motors group of advanced technology regions comes close to being a bluff. Its economy is increasingly dependent on multinational capital as the old indigenous industrial elite declines. Yet it has successfully projected itself as a leader of an emerging Europe of the Regions, while Galicia continues to labour under a negative auto-stereotype.
In economic development, Catalonia has the easier task, given its favourable location and higher standard of living and some of the policy differences reflect EU and Spanish rules, for example on the amount of subsidy that can be given to investment. Yet allowing for these, Catalonia has a more selective and less assistentialist approach to development. Services to firms are charged for those that are not used are closed down. More emphasis is placed on private sector leadership, reflecting the existence of a local business elite. While Galician policy can hardly be described a dirigiste, there is a much heavier emphasis on government initiative and public funding. Catalonia is also more in line with contemporary development thinking in its emphasis on human capital, technology and innovation, while Galicia retains the traditional emphasis on physical plant. Consequently, development remains dependent on continuing subsidies, with little capacity for self-sustaining growth.
In both cases, the challenge is to move to a modernizing regionalism, in opposition both to traditionalist regionalism and to a global neo-liberalism which would dissolve the region as a framework for public action altogether. This involves a conjunction of institution-building, cultural policy and economic development. Again, this has been more successful in Catalonia, but the limited deployment of Catalan in business life shows the limits to this strategy. It would be a great simplification to describe Catalonia as a successful region and Galicia as a failure. Both face the same challenge in building a development model and both have their strengths and weaknesses when looked at in a European perspective. What they do show, however, is that regions are not merely policy-takers, subjected to a single global model of development, but that different strategies, mobilizing social and cultural resources, are possible.
